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Politics in Friesl and ry9r-r798
In The Netherlands the last decades of the r8th century were characterised by grave
social and political upheavals. The catastrophic outcor.ne of tl're Fourth Ar-rslo-Dutch
War (r78o-t78+) did not only bring economic disaster, but it stressed the decline of
the oligarchically governed Dutch Republic. Stadtholder'Will iam V was the scape-
goat; the patriot movement, consisting of republican regents, enlightened citizens, re-
l igious dissenters and other polit ical malcontents, openly challenged his posirion. The
patriots, lvho demanded greater influence in politics and government, at first did not
succeed in this. ln 1787 Prussian soldiers brought the revolutionary ambitions of the
Dutch patriots to an end. Persecution irnd exile were their lot.
The year r79j saw rhe second lound. 'War witl-r France led to a French invasion. The
Stadtholder fled to England and in The Netherlands the Batavian Revolution brol<e
out. \Within the l<losely organised Dutch state, in which loyalry to one's orvr-r egion
or town was marked, the stress was on the local activities of the revolutionaries. Lo-
cal commirtees removed the sitt ing regents and appointed ternporary goverr.rors. It
was a bloodless revolution. The Batavian revolutionaries proved forgiving and the old
rulers did not put up much resistance.
In Friesland, however, miltters were rather more grim. In Leer-rwarden especially, r:r-
dicrl eiements tried to spoil the party. Local hot-heads, spurred on by the populist
mennonite preacher Abraham Staal, threatened to lay their hands on the sitting re-
gents. More moderate forces an-rong the Leeurvarden burghers could prevcnt a day of
reckoning. On 7 February r79j these patriot dignitaries also took the initiative for a
regional revolution. They formed a provincial revolutionary cornmitree, which steer-
ed the revolution towards calmer waters. The Friesian revolutionaries did not hesi-
tate. In June ry95 the first democratically elected representatives were chosen, whicli
marked the official end of the revolution. Friesland had taken a comfortable lead over
the other provinces, which were as yet governed 'provisionally'. This filled the Fries-
ians with pride.
SUMMARY
The new government, consisting of well-to-do merchants and industrialists, high ci-
vil servants, rich farmers but also a remarkable number of reformed village vicars,
which gave it the name of 'vicars'government', took a moderate and federalistic cour-
se. In contrast to the radicals among the civilians, for whom the revolution in Fries-
land had not even begun, and who wished to reform sociery drastically by revolutio-
nary means, the new rulers were content with things as they were. They rejected
political violence wholeheartedly and did not want any further disturbances of the
law. Political and social problems had to be solved gradually; dissenters ought not to
be victims of revolutionary caprice, but should be reconciled to the new order by reas-
onable means.
The radicals, however, who had taken power at an early stage of the revolution in
towns like Leeuwarden and Dokkum and in a number of rural areas, did not want to
hear about reconciliation. From their main basis at Leeuwarden, the 'volkssocieteit',
where revanchistic and anarchistic sentiments were rife, they set themselves against
the Friesian rulers. Not only were the members of the new Leeuwarden town coun-
cil recruited from this revolutionary sociery but it dictated in a large measure the po-
licies of the Friesian capital, policies that clung to civil autonomy for the town and
refused to submit to the authority of the Friesian representatives. who did not want
to accept such local particularism. A strong card in the hands of the radicals was the
call for compensation. The fondest wish of these radicals, in which they were secon-
ded by a great many Friesian armed civil regiments and popular societies, was to have
their own back on the old regent classes for the injuries suffered by the Friesian pa-
triots after ry87.The radicals, who soon had their own party journal and were tight-
ly organised through a closely knit provincial network of societies sympathetic to their
cause, had yet another card up their sleeve: the claim for national uniry.
With its clear and broadly accepted provincialism Friesland was marked out for a mi-
litant federalism. The national unity propagated by the province of Holland, and the
setting up of a National Convention, went against the grain of Friesian chauvinism.
It was the fear of Holland's expansionism which fed the Friesian aversion against na-
tionai unity. The leading classes feared the economic and financial consequences of
uniry the man in the street was afraid of the demographical supremacy of Holland.
The federalists, who cherished the old federative model as a stronghold of civil free-
dom against despotism, and who were supported by most of the Friesians as was pro-
ved by a referendum held in November 1795, formed a majority among the regional
rulers. The radicals, howeveq who felt that the old system of government only served
to support the old order, made good use of the call for uniry. It ensured them not on-
ly political support from the ever powerful province of Holland, it gave them also a
propagandistic weapon against the new political elite in Friesland which they thought
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SUMMARY
were in the way of reform. The only disadvanrage was, rhar a growing fear of politi-
cal extremism drove the moderate supporters of national unity among Friesian rulers
into the arms of the federalists, to whom they felt closer anl.rvay than to the radical
unitarists.
The controversy over the future Dutch form of government turned out not to be the
real controversy among Friesian revolutionaries. This was soon shown by the radicals
when they took over Power in Friesland and came to be even more federalistic than
their federalistic predecessors. The real conflict was berween moderate and radical.
Harmony or conflict, reconciliation or retaliation, persuasion or force, these were the
strategic questions which radically divided revolutionary Friesland. The controversy
berween radical and moderate was so all-embracing in these years rhar it cut through
all other political barriers. Those in favour and those agair-rst uniry were to be found
among both movements. The gap soon could no longer be bridged and Friesland be-
came the scene of a revolutionary battle ending in a coup, followed by a revolutio-
nary reign of terror.
The fraternal war escalated duri.g the summer of ry95. Local militants plundered
Leeuwarden and made short measure with everything remaining from the former re-
gime of the stadtholders. High point of this truely iconoclastic fury was rhe demolish-
ing of the tomb and the desecration of the graves of the Friesian Nassau family i1
the Grote Kerk, a barbaric act which was abhorred nationally. The Friesian authori-
ties hit back harshly. The worst mutinists were arresred and submitted to severe ou-
trislrtrrerrt. The Friesc/te Courant, thc radical jounral, was fbrbidden ancl rhe 1.,.,,111.,
societies were threatened to be closed. By dismantling the revolutionary nerwork, the
moderate rulers hoped at the same time to be able to isolate the mother sociery in
Leeuwarden from the so-called outside socieries. The ban on taking part in rhe Cen-
tral Convention' a national organisation which under auspices of the authoriries in
Holland were strongly advocating a Natior-ral Convention, minimised the freedom of
movement of the Friesian radicals evet-r further. The regime also made haste to set up
provincial armed forces, so as ro be able to keep in reign the radical opposition.
The self-willed Leeuwarden rown councillers, who had nor pur anyrhing in the way
of the ultra-radicals, were also called to order by rhe Friesian rulers. Local democra-
cy was suspended and provincial rules for the election of local rulers, civil servanrs,
teachers, etc., were clearly intended to demolish civil autonomy. The town council-
lers refused to submit to provincial authoriry however, which led to their arrest and
deposition in January ry96. But soon the tables were turned. The stubbornness with
which the Friesian governmenr rried to block the serring up of a National Conven-
tion did not only irritate the other provinces, but soon also the allies in France. \When
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the Friesiarrs, together with those from Zeeland, even rhough they had negotiared a
great number of concessions in the matter of regional autonomy, still refused to join
the National Convention, aud even rhreatened to step our of the union, parience lvas
up. It was decided to remove the Friesian government. The ruling moderates in Hol-
land were even prepared to collaborate with the shaken Friesian radicals to achieve
this. And the proposed coup in Friesland was agreed to in secret by the authorit ies in
Paris. The coup was prepared by a mutiny among the almost rooo men of the Leeu-
warden :rrmed civil forcc.
After the French hacl pulled back out of Friesland in the beginning of February, leaving
the Friesian capital in the highest state of preparation, the federalistic 'vicars' govern-
ment' was soon finished. A revolutionary committee, consisting of agents fiom Hol-
land and prominent Friesian ultra-radicals, took over power in Friesland. A great ma-
ny representatives were deposed and forced into exile. The Leeuwarden town council
was reinstated, the officers of the local anned forces disarmed and disbanded. Else-
where in Friesland too, e.g. in l{arl ingen, local government changed hands under the
threat of violence. At first the trew rulers governed by decree. Later manipulated elec-
tions had to keep up an appearance of democracy. Polit ical purges on a grand scale,
a strict declaration of loyalty, fbrced internments and the setting up of local watchful
comittees illustrate the reign of terror thar the radicals nolv kept up.
The ourside world at first closed their eyes. For the new rulers had immediately de-
cided in favour of the National Convention, which replaced the States General on r
March ry96.This was, however, no more than a first step towards national unifica-
tion. Further uniry required a new constitution, rvhich took some time to be rvritten.
A first draft was ready in November 1796, a second one in rhe summer of ry97.The
latter ccluld not convince the Dutch elecrorate. 'When a new draft threatened to be
rejected as well, the only remedy was seen to be a coup. Radicals led by Pierer \iree-
de took power early in q98.They dtew up a centralistic constitLrtion and put this to
a purif ied electorate, which accepted this one in the end. In May 1798 the Batavian
Republic had becorne a rnodern unified state. The position of rhe former provinces
was charrged radically. Provincial autonomy rvas rejected and the provincial govern-
ments were submitted to a strong national authority.
Befbre 1798 horvever', rhe provinces had been fully auronornous. They could thank
Friesian stubbornness for that. The rules of the National Conventior-r only tolerated
iurervention in the provinces in a srnall number of exceprional cases. As long as the
people's government in Leeuwarden kept its fin,rncial obligations - which they did -
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the national government could do little against the regime in Friesland, €xcept giving
strong warnings. The Friesian radicals, who saw the intervention from The Hague as
meddling in Friesland's internal matters, a rreasure of their pure unaldulterated f-e-
deralism, had great freedom of movement. The rules gave them every opportuniry to
continue the Friesian revolutionary experiment.
Quite revolutionary in these years too was the composition of the Friesian Council
of Justice, the fbrmer 
'Hof'. The distinguished lawyers of before had been removed
ro make place for completely unlearned and incompetent people such as the famous
satirist and writer from Holland Gerrit Paape and the radical mennonite preacher
Staal. Real and imaginary opponents of the people's government were siven draconi-
cally severe punishments. The Provincial Council, which was chosen yearly by no mo-
re than a few thousand faithful adherents of the hated regime, consisted mainly of
poor civilians, rel:rtively many of these catholics, who were quite militant in Friesland
in these years. The councils in towns and vil lages, who were controlled continuously
by watchful committees, were little better. In some villages anarchy reigr-red.
In Barradeel in the north-wewst of Friesland, rhe local civil armed forces led their own
reign of terror. Other municipaliries were split in wo by revolutionary factions, oF-
ten fighting out old village feuds. Religious conflicts could also play a lole. In towns
like Sneek, Harlingen and'Workum, revolutionary groups clashed severely. Govern-
ment committees traveled far and wide to separate the fighters and bring them to
order. The biggest threat to the regime in Leeuwarden, therefore, was not so much
the representatives in exile with their non-violent opposition against the reigning ra-
dicals from outside, but the ir.rternal strife and opposition among the radicals them-
selves.
Early in ry97 a veritable civii war threatened. A discussion berween the Council of
Justice and the Provincial Council about the way in which the old regents had to re-
pay the damage they had done, led to a violent row berween government and judges.
This row did not only lead in the end to the removal of the judges from the Coun-
cil, but also to an unprecedentedly severe internal quarrel rvithir-r the Friesian govern-
ment, which threatened to be taken up in the rest of the province. The regime tot-
tered, but it survived. The Kollumer Oproer (Revolution of Kollum), which broke
out in the Friesian '\Touden' area due to discontent over military service, and which
brought many hundreds of Friesi:rns together, brought a solurion. This orangistic re-
volr was one of the scarce examples in the history of the Dutch revolution years when
the spilling of blood was not just talked about. The radicals were forced to put their
internal quarrels aside and temporarily close their ranks. The regime in Leeuwarden
acted severely agair.rst the rebels. There were dead and badly wounded on both sides.
5zt
SUMMARY
An attack on the radical stronghold Dokkum was fought off violently. Dozens of ar-
rested revolutionaries were led through the packed streets of Leeuwarden. Some of
them awaited a death sentence. The dauntlessness with which the people's military
repressed the revolt and the cruelty with which Friesian courts dealt with the rebels,
were a demonstration of revolutionary decisiveness. Friesland would show the nation
how these things ought to be done.
The rest of the nation was appalled, however. The National Convention, which in-
vestigated the situatior-r in Friesland thoroughly, had no means of doing anything. But
the regime in Leeuwarden had gone too far in one respect. A few dozen former Fries-
ian regents had been arrested as alleged leaders of the revolt and were kept in the much
feared Blokhuis (the 'Friesian Bastille') to support the loud clamours for compensa-
tion. This the political leaders in France considered a step too far. The limit had been
reached. The Friesian ultra-radicals were forced to let the hostages go, and they had
to put up with another disappointment soon afterwards. When in april 1797 they stal
ted confiscating the possessions of the refusing ex-regents in connection with the com-
pensation question, once again the National Convention said no - probably once mo-
re under French pressure. The Leeuwarden regime, which had made this their prime
issue, fell into a deep crisis, from which it would never arise.
The unity which resulted from the Kollumer Oproer was short-lived. Faction strife
Ilared up again and the province became hardly governable. When the promised com-
pensation was not forthcoming, people's societies and militias started to grumble.
Their supporters complained and they turned their backs on the Leeuwarden regime
more and more. Local revolutior-raries left the provincial network and went their own
way. An ever greater threat to the revolutionary experiment in Friesland than this des-
integration which could hardly be halted, were the moderating tendencies. The clear-
est manifestation of this was the gradually less militant position of the Leeuwarden
town council, which removed themselves more and more from the strangulating in-
fluence of the local people's society. In the provincial government too, more modera-
te sounds could be heard. Some people's representatives openly called for reconcilia-
tion with their exiled predecessors, though without success. But even the most
obdurate radicals felt the need for a stronger provincial unity. For the threat to Fries-
land came from outside. National unification, on which The Hague was working hard,
threatened Friesian independence, and this was bound to lead to an early end to the
revolutionary experiment.
It is ironic that the Friesian radicals, which in ry95,in their battle against the federa-
lists, had been champions of uniry now fought their breath out against national uni-
fication. Their counterparts in Holland, who worked to achieve unity by means of a
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coup, were told not to detract frorn the existing rules of the National Convention.
They did not listen to their Friesian federalist friends. The radical coup of January
1798, which had even been financed secretly by means of Friesian tax revenues, hel-
ped the Friesian people's government out of its death struggle. The Vreede regime and
its constitution brought Friesland's provincial autonomy to ar-r end and liberated the
province from a revolutionary reign of terror under which it had suffered for rwo
years. Vreede's regime, however, did not live long either. A few months later the na-
tional radicals were chased from their cushions by yet another coup, this time a mo-
derate one. This does not detract anything at all fiom the indeed paradoxical fact that
it were their political friends that made clear ro the Friesian revolutionaries that their
experiment had no future. It was not the only piece of irony in the history of Bata-
vian Friesland.
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